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Geis and Smith: Labor Law Successorship under the National Bituminous Coal Wage A

LABOR LAW SUCCESSORSHIP UNDER THE
NATIONAL BITUMINOUS COAL WAGE
AGREEMENT AND THE UNION'S CAMPAIGN
FOR JOB SECURITY
THOMAS P. GiEs*
WARD L. SMITH**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Article I of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of
1988 ("Wage Agreement" or "NBCWA") contains a broadly-written
successorship provision. In addition to the "successors and assigns"
language found in most collective bargaining agreements,' Article I
imposes an affirmative duty on each signatory employer to insure
that the obligations of the Wage Agreement are assumed by the purchaser of any coal mining operation covered by the NBCWA. Certain
provisions in Article IA of the Wage Agreement attempt to protect
the job security of employees represented by the United Mine Workers of America ("UMWA" or "Union") in connection with the wide
variety of coal lands leasing, contracting and licensing arrangements
that characterize the industry. These provisions have become increasingly important as the continued depressed state of the industry
has increased unemployment in the coal fields, particularly among
unionized employees. 2 As part of the recent negotiations for the 1988
* Partner, Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C.; B.A. 1972, University of Notre Dame; J.D.
1976, George Washington University.
** Associate, Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C.; B.S. 1980, Northwest Missouri State University; M.A. 1982, Baylor University; M.G.A. 1985, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1986, University
of Pennsylvania.
1. A typical successorship provision states that the collective bargaining agreement shall be
binding on the signatory employer, and its "successors and assigns." Such language does not impose
an affirmative obligation on the seller to ensure that the contract is assumed by the purchaser. See,
e.g., Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 258 n.3 (1974).
2. Press accounts estimate that as many as one-third of UMWA members are unemployed.
Coal Week, Oct. 13, 1986, p.l. UMWA membership has declined from more than 500,000 to less than
200,000 active members since 1940. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1986, p. E-5, col. 1. The share of coal that
is mined by UMWA members has declined from 70% to 50% in the last ten years. N.Y Times, Oct.
28, 1986, p. A-20, col.2.
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Wage Agreement, the parties agreed to new job security provisions

that impose additional obligations on signatory employers concerning
operations not covered by previous wage agreements.
These contractual provisions impose obligations on coal industry
employers that extend well beyond the statutory obligations imposed

by the Labor Management Relations Act ("Act"). 3 Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act4 makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse to bargain with a labor organization representing its employees. In some instances the purchaser of a business may be found to
be a successor employer obligated to assume its predecessor's bargaining obligations. 5 However, section 8(a)(5) of the Act generally
does not require the successor employer to assume the predecessor's
collective bargaining agreement.

The Wage Agreement's successorship and job security provisions
are a response to the Supreme Court's decisions in NLRB v. Burns
Int'l Sec. Serv. 6 and Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint
Exec. Bd. 7 These contractual provisions have been difficult to apply

in a number of frequently recurring situations, particularly in cases
involving the transfer of mining rights to coal reserves or inactive
coal-producing facilities. The economic pressure on cost-conscious
operators resulting from the continued depressed state of coal prices

3. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-87 (1982).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
5. Section 8(a)(5) has generated a considerable body of case law setting out the standards for
determining whether a purchasing employer will be found to be a successor. See, e.g., NLRB v. Burns
Int'l Sec. Serv., 406 U.S. 272 (1972). These standards are discussed in more detail infra note 17 and
accompanying text. Successorship is a fact-specific determination, made by the Board after a review
of the "totality of the circumstances." Under these standards, a business transaction and the purchaser's
resulting operation often can be structured in such a way as to preclude a finding of successorship.
See, e.g., Border Steel Rolling Mills, 204 N.L.R.B. 814, 823 (1973) (predecessor's operation was completely integrated into new employer's overall operations, resulting in an insufficient community of
interest among the predecessor's employees to retain a separate bargaining unit for them); Norton
Precision Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 1003, 1007-08 (1972) (change in production methods, type of market
supplied, method of doing business, and kinds of products produced substantially altered nature and
character of employer to preclude successorship finding); Georgetown Stainless Mfg. Corp., 198 N.L.R.B.
234, 237-38 (1972) (changes in machinery, methods and pace of production, and product support
conclusion that new employer is not a successor).
6. Burns, 406 U.S. 272.
7. HowardJohnson, 417 U.S. 249. This successorship language has been part of every National
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement since the 1974 Wage Agreement. See UMWA v. Eastover Mining
Co., 603 F. Supp. 1038, 1042 (W.D. Va. 1985).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/9
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has exacerbated this controversy, as many industry employers seek
to operate inactive mines without the additional financial burdens
imposed by the Wage Agreement. The new job security provisions
added to the 1988 Wage Agreement raise a new set of uncertainties
for employers.
This article evaluates the existing state of labor law successorship
in the coal industry, with particular emphasis on cases interpreting
Article I of the Wage Agreement as it is applied to transactions
involving inactive coal properties, and on the job security provisions
of Article II of the 1988 NBCWA. Part II of this Article summarizes
the basic principles of labor law successorship, which provide the
necessary background for a full understanding of the scope of Articles I and II of the Wage Agreement. Part III of this Article reviews
the successorship provisions of Article I of the Wage Agreement in
detail, and discusses the various interpretations given its provisions
by arbitrators, the courts, and the National Labor Relations Board
("Board"). Part III also reviews the related provisions of Article 1A
of the NBCWA, as they apply to various forms of leasing and contracting of coal producing properties. Part IV of this Article examines
the new job security provisions of Article II of the 1988 Wage Agreement, which establish a new procedure for staffing at non-signatory
operations of signatory employers. Part V of this Article argues that
some courts and arbitrators have improperly extended the reach of
the contractual successorship and job security obligations, and suggests an interpretation of Articles I and II of the Wage Agreement
that is more harmonious with the overriding objectives of federal
labor law policy.
II.

THE LABOR LAW OF SUCCESSORS=nP

The statutory labor law of successorship is derived from the obligations imposed by Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 8 Section 8(a)(5) makes
it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with
a labor organization representing its employees. The successorship
doctrine has been developed by the Board and the courts to define

8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
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the labor relations obligations of the purchaser of a business in order
to ensure that business transactions are not carried out for the purpose of evading the bargaining obligations imposed by Section 8(a)(5).
The development of the law of successorship has focused on determining whether or not a particular purchaser is a "successor" and,
if so, defining the nature of the labor relations obligations assumed
as a result. 9

The Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Burns Intl Sec. Serv. 0
is the cornerstone of statutory labor law successorship. In that case,
Burns International Security replaced another contractor, Wackenhut, which had provided security protection for Lockheed Aircraft.
Wackenhut's employees were covered by a collective bargaining
agreement with the United Plant Guard Workers. Burns retained 27
of the Wackenhut guards and supplemented them with 15 of its own
guards from other locations; hence, a majority of Burns' new workforce was composed of Wackenhut personnel previously represented
by the Plant Guards. When Burns hired the former Wackenhut employees, however, it provided them with membership cards in the
American Federation of Guards, the union representing Burns' employees at other locations. Wackenhut's union demanded recognition
and insisted that Burns honor the union's collective bargaining agreement with Wackenhut. Burns refused, and the Plant Guards filed
unfair labor practice charges alleging that Burns was Wackenhut's
successor and thus obligated to recognize the Plant Guards and to
assume Wackenhut's collective bargaining agreement.
The Board held that Burns had violated Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act, both by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Plant Guards
and by refusing to honor the pre-existing collective bargaining agreement." The Board concluded that Burns was bound to the Wack9. The successorship doctrine is to be distinguished from the related labor law concept of alter
ego. When the purchaser and seller are not distinctly separate entities, but rather have substantially
identical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision, and ownership,
the Board may hold that the second employer is the "alter ego" of the first employer. Alter ego
employers, in stark contrast to successor employers, are required to assume the terms of the predecessor's existing collective bargaining agreement, as well as the prior employer's bargaining obligations.
E.g., Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1976).
10. Burns, 406 U.S. 272.
11. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970).
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enhut contract "as if it were a signatory thereto," even though there
had been no merger (or even sale of assets) between Burns and Wackenhut. 12 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that the
Board had exceeded its power in requiring Burns to assume Wackenhut's labor contract. 3
The Supreme Court's decision in Burns resolved two issues that
are critical to the labor law of successorship. First, the Court held
that the Board could not force Burns to adopt the Wackenhut collective bargaining agreement. The Board's conclusion, the Court held,
was inconsistent with the Act's fundamental policy of free and unfettered collective bargaining. The Court concluded that requiring a
new employer to take over an existing contract might inhibit the
alienability of businesses, and also would violate Section 8(d) of the
Act. 14 While the Court acknowledged that an employer might voluntarily adopt an existing labor agreement, it held that Section 8(a)(5)
15
did not mandate such adoption.
The Court then concluded that the Board properly had ordered
Burns to bargain with Wackenhut's union. The Court found "substantial continuity" in the business enterprise, noting that Burns performed the same duties in the same location and in the same manner
as had Wackenhut. Significantly, Burns had voluntarily chosen to
hire Wackenhut's workforce, and these employees constituted a majority of Burns' workforce. On this basis, the Court concluded that
a majority of Burns' workforce should be deemed to desire continued
representation by their prior union representative.1 6 As a result, the
Court sustained the Board's conclusion that Burns was a successor
employer obligated under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act to recognize
Wackenhut's union as the collective bargaining representative of its

12. Id. at 350.
13. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). Section 8(d) stipulates that the duty to bargain "does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."
15. Burns, 406 U.S. at 291.
16. Id. at 277-81.
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employees. This resolution of the successorship question has come
to be known as the "continuity of the enterprise" test. 17
In Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd.,18 the

Supreme Court established another important tenet of the successorship doctrine in holding that a successor employer cannot be required to arbitrate the extent of its obligation to hire its predecessor's
employees. In 1972, Howard Johnson bought the personal property
and assets of a motor lodge from a predecessor, which had signed

two separate collective bargaining agreements with a union. Both
labor contracts provided that they would be binding on the employer's "successors, assigns, purchasers, lessees or transferees. "'19
Howard Johnson refused to recognize the union or assume either

of the seller's labor agreements. Instead, it began to hire new workers. In response, the union filed suit in state court seeking a temporary restraining order barring Howard Johnson from "locking out"

and compelling the company to arbitrate its contractual responsibilities to hire the predecessor's employees. The defendants removed
the case to federal court, claiming that it properly was a Section 301
action. 20 The district court ordered Howard Johnson to arbitrate the

issue of its obligations to the unionized employees, but refused to
order the company to rehire all these employees. 2' The Supreme Court

ultimately reversed, concluding that Howard Johnson was neither
obliged to hire the previous employees nor to arbitrate its alleged
responsibility to do so. The Court reasoned that because only nine
17. This test has been applied by the Board and the Courts in making successorship determinations in a wide variety of factual circumstances. See, e.g., Border Steel Rolling Mills, 204 N.L.R.B.
814 (1973) (where predecessor unit has been integrated into larger unit, no separate bargaining is required); Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. 249 (asset sale without continuation of a majority of predecessor's
employees; no successorship); Industrial Catering Co., 224 N.L.R.B. 972 (1976) (though location of
business remained the same, lack of majority and changes in business operation precluded successorship); Valley Nitrogen Producers, 207 N.L.R.B. 208 (1973) (purchaser used same facilities, equipment, inventory, customers and a majority of predecessor's employees; successorship found).
18. Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. 249.
19. Id. at 251.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). Section 301 of the Act conveys jurisdiction on federal courts to
hear cases claiming a breach of a collective bargaining agreement.
21. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. Howard Johnson Co., 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2329 (E.D.
Mich. 1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1973).
22. Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 260-62.
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of Howard Johnson's 34 employees were former union members, a
majority of its workforce was not made up of the previously unionized employees and thus there was insufficient "continuity" in
23
the workforce to justify arbitration under the predecessor contract.
The underlying question resolved in Howard Johnson thus was
whether a new employer has an obligation to hire the former employees of its predecessor. The Court held that no such obligation
existed, even though the predecessor's labor contract contained a
successorship provision.24
The Court's decision in Howard Johnson raised questions about
the continued vitality of the Court's earlier decision in Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston.25 Wiley held that, in a case involving a merger between
two companies, the resulting business entity could be compelled to
arbitrate a dispute arising under the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. The tension between Wiley and Howard Johnson
remains unresolved, although the Court in Howard Johnson suggested that the differing results reached in the two cases might be
due to the complete disappearance of the predecessor corporation in
Wiley and the union's lack of remedy against the company with
whom it had an agreement. 6
The Supreme Court added an additional dimension to the successorship question in its decision last year in Fall River Dyeing &
Finishing Corp. v. NLRB. 27 The case arose after a New England
textile manufacturer fell on hard times in February, 1982, and laid
off all but a skeleton crew of its employees. Six months later it closed
its business entirely. One of the company's former executives then
formed Fall River and purchased the predecessor's assets and part

23. Id. at 264. The Court's reliance on this factor was the principle justification for its conclusion
that there was no continuity of the enterprise as that term was used in Burns, 417 U.S. at 263. The
Court acknowledged that the successorship inquiry may lead to different results in different cases,
concluding that an employer "may be a successor for some purposes and not for others." Id. at 263
n.9.

24. Id. at 261-62. Howard Johnson also established that an employer violates Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act if it discriminates on the basis of union activity or membership in making its hiring decisions.
Id. at 262 n.8.
25. Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
26. Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257.
27. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987).
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of its inventory. Fall River began operations in September 1982, some
seven months after the original layoff. Fall River used many of the
same facilities and manufacturing processes as its predecessor. Fall
River hired its own work force from newspaper advertisements, although it did hire many of the predecessor's former supervisors and
employees.
Only one month after Fall River began operating - but several
months before it reached anything approaching full production the union that had represented the predecessor's workers requested
recognition from Fall River. At the time recognition was requested,
a large majority of Fall River's employees had worked for that firm.
Fall River denied the union's request. Once full production was
achieved, employees of the predecessor no longer constituted a majority of Fall River's employees, and Fall River continued its denial
of the union's demand for recognition.
Fall River's refusal to honor the union's demand for recognition
was held unlawful by the Board. 28 The Board agreed with Fall River
that the union's initial demand for recognition was premature insofar
as it preceded any substantial production by Fall River. Nonetheless,
the initial bargaining demand was held to have "continuing effect"
which required recognition if, once Fall River hired a "substantial
and representative complement," 29 a majority of the workers continued to consist of the predecessor's employees. The Board found
that a "substantial and representative complement" was hired by
January 1983, and that a majority of the work force at that time
still consisted of the predecessor's employees. Fall River's refusal to
recognize the union at that time thus was held unlawful, even though
the predecessor's former employees no longer constituted a majority
by the time Fall River attained full production.30
28. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 272 N.L.R.B. 839 (1984).
29. The Board makes its determination of successorship at the time a "substantial and representative complement" of employees is hired; if the new employer is determined to be a successor
employer at that point, it inherits its predecessor's duty to bargain. Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B.
194 (1974). The Board's application of this standard involves an inquiry as to "whether the job classifications designated for the operation were filled or substantially filled and whether the operation
was in normal or substantially normal production." E.g., Premium Foods v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 623,
628 (9th Cir. 1983).
30. Fall River, 272 N.L.R.B. at 840-41.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/9
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The Supreme Court upheld the Board's decision. 31 In doing so,
the Court reaffirmed the Burns proposition that an employer is free
to rearrange the business and hire its own work force upon a change
in ownership:
We observed in Burns that, although the successor has an obligation to bargain
with the union, it is ordinarily free to set initial terms on which it will hire the
employees of a predecessor, and it is not bound by the substantive provisions of
the predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement. We further explained that the
successor is under no obligation to hire the employees of its predecessor, subject,
of course, to the restriction that it not discriminate against union employees in its
hiring. Thus, to a substantial extent the applicability of Burns rests in the hands
of the successor. If the new employer makes a conscious decision to maintain
generally the same business and to hire a majority of its employees from the
predecessor, then the bargaining obligation of § 8(a)(5) is activated.32

In determining whether the new employer has made a conscious
decision to maintain generally the same business, the Court approached the issue from the viewpoint of the employees. According
to the Court, Fall River did not alter the basic nature of the business;
it continued to employ personnel on the same equipment and in the
same job classifications as had its predecessor, and it continued to
employ many of the same supervisors as had its predecessor. The
substantial diminution in the size of the workforce and alterations
in customers and marketing strategy were disregarded because they
had no impact upon the employer-employee relationship. Similarly,
the seven-month hiatus in operations did not preclude a finding of
successorship, as the Court stated that such a hiatus is a determining
factor only when there are other indicia of discontinuity.33 Indeed,
since Fall River had kept on a skeleton crew during the hiatus, the
Court reasoned that employees may have viewed the hiatus as substantially less than seven months. 4 As a result of these facts, the
Court concluded that the Board had properly found Fall River to
35
be a successor.
31. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2240.
32. Id. at 2234 (citations omitted). The Court also acknowledged the tension between Burns and
Wiley as to the issue of workforce continuity, endorsing the decision of the Board holding that an
employer will be held to be a successor if a majority of its employees were employed by the predecessor.
Id. at 2237 n.12.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2237.

35. Id.
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The Fall River Court's emphasis on the employees' perspective
as the critical viewpoint for determining successorship reveals a dif-

ferent point of emphasis than that adopted in Burns. The Court in
Burns was principally concerned with the ability of a new employer

to restructure its operations, recognizing that a substantial discontinuity between the new employer and the predecessor militates against
a finding that the new employer should be obligated to assume the
predecessor's bargaining obligations. 6 The Fall River Court, on the
other hand, concluded that a temporary hiatus followed by minor

changes in operations will not defeat a successorship finding, if the
basic nature of the employer-employee relationship remain unchanged.3 7 To the extent that FallRiver represents a shift in emphasis

with regard to the successorship inquiry, it may make it more likely
that buyers of coal-producing facilities will be found to be successor

employees.3 8
The sale of a business in which the employees are represented by
a labor organization raises two other labor relations obligations that
should be mentioned in any discussion of successorship. First, a selling employer may be obligated to bargain with its incumbent union
over the effects of the decision to sell. In First Natl Maint. Corp.

v. NLRB, 39 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that an employer
has a duty to bargain over the effects of a sale of part of its business

despite having no duty to bargain over the decision.40 Second, a
36. Burns, 406 U.S. at 277-81.
37. FallRiver, 107 S. Ct. at 2237.
38. Burns, 406 U.S. at 280-81. See, e.g., UMWA Local 1329 v. NLRB, 812 F.2d 741 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (vacating decision of Board concluding that the purchaser of two coal mines was not a
Burns successor; court noted absence of evidence of a possible change in employee attitude towArd
representation by the UMWA as a critical factor in the successorship analysis).
39. First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
40. The employer's obligation to engage in effects bargaining requires that the union must be
given the opportunity to engage in "meaningful" effects bargaining, through adequate prior notice of
the employer's decision. First Nat' Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. 666. See, e.g., Metropolitan Telectronics,
279 N.L.R.B. 134 (1986) (employer did not provide union with meaningful opportunity to engage in
effects bargaining when it relocated its operation before notifying the union of its decision). The duty
to bargain includes an obligation to respond to certain requests for information made by the union.
See generally, NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). Unions frequently make such requests
in the course of effects bargaining, and an employer violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act if it ignores
the union's requests for information relevant either to the bargaining or to the administration of the
labor contract. See, e.g., Coalite, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 40 (1986); United Graphics, Inc., 281 N.L.R.B.
70 (1986).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/9
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purchaser that is determined to be a successor may be liable for the
unfair labor practices of its predecessor, regardless of whether it
4
agrees to assume that liability. '
III.

CONTRACTUAL LABOR LAW SuccEssoRsmr IN TIE COAL
INDUSTRY

Burns and HowardJohnson established that the parties to a business transaction may arrange the transaction in such a way as to
relieve the purchaser of the seller's labor relations obligations. The
pattern of leasing, contracting, and licensing that typifies the coal
industry created numerous opportunities for industry employers to
avoid the collective bargaining obligations of their predecessors. These
pressures, when added to the fact that layoffs are an unfortunate
way of life in the coal industry, led the UMWA to seek contractual
protection of its hard-fought representational position in the coal
fields.
A. The Assumption and Notice Provisions of Article I of the
1988 Wage Agreement
The 1988 Wage Agreement imposes contractual obligations on
signatory employers in successorship situations that go beyond the
bargaining obligations of the Act. The principal successorship clause
of the 1988 Wage Agreement is Article I, which states in part that:
This Agreement shall be binding upon all signatories hereto, including those Em-

ployers which are members of signatory associations, and their successors and
assigns. In consideration of the Union's execution of this Agreement, each Employer promises that its operations covered by this Agreement shall not be sold,
conveyed, or otherwise transferred or assigned to any successor without first securing the agreement of the successor to assume the Employer's obligationsunder
this Agreement. Immediately upon the conclusion of such sale, conveyance, as-

signment or transferof its operations, the Employer shall notify the Union of the
transaction. Such notification shall be by certified mail to the Secretary-Treasurer
of the International Union and shall be accompanied by documentation that the
successor obligation has been satisfied. Provided that the Employer shall not be
a guarantor or be held liable for any breach by the successor or assignee of its

41. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
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obligations, and the UMWA will look exclusively to the successor or assignee for
compliane with the terms of this Agreement.

42

The assumption and notice provisions of Article I require that
any transaction involving operations "covered by this Agreement"

must include the express commitment of the purchaser to assume
the obligations of the Wage Agreement, as well as the selling employer's obligation to notify the Union of any such transaction. Ar-

ticle I language in previous wage agreements has been subject to
numerous disputes between operators and the union as to its intended
scope.

1.

The "'saleor conveyance" clause.

The threshhold issue in many disputes regarding the scope of
Article I of the Wage Agreement is whether the transaction fits within
the "sold, conveyed, or otherwise transferred" language of Article

I. This language, which has been standard in previous industry wage
agreements, has received a broad reading by arbitrators called upon
to interpret it in particular circumstances. 4 Arbitrators generally have
disregarded the form of a disputed transaction and found that there
has been a "sale or conveyance" within the meaning of Article I

whenever there is some "linkage" between the prior and subsequent
employers. The necessary linkage generally has been found whenever
there was direct dealing between the prior and subsequent employers,
whether that dealing was in the form of negotiations, sale of assets,
or common ownership. 44

One recurring situation in which linkage has not been found is
represented by the facts in Gopher Mining Co. 45 There, the owner
42. National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1988, art. I (emphasis added) [hereinafter
NBCWA of 1988].
43. Like most collective bargaining agreements, Article XXIII of the NBCVA provides that all
disputes as to the meaning and application of the contract shall be resolved through the grievance
procedure, which culminates in final and binding arbitration. As a result, most disputes over the meaning
of Article I are submitted to arbitration. Arbitration awards may be challenged in an action to vacate
under Section 301 of the Act, but a reviewing court will be very reluctant to vacate an arbitrator's
decision so long as the award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. See United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
44. Standard Pocohantas Coal Corp., Arb. Rev. Bd. No. 78-16 (Sept. 21, 1979) (former operator
made direct contractual arrangements with another operator to take over the operations; second operator
obligated to assume Wage Agreement by virtue of its successorship and leasing provisions).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/9
45. Gopher Mining Co., Arb. Rev. Bd. No. 35 (July 10, 1975) (Lynch, Arb.).
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of coal lands leased the property to a mine operator. After the operator had abandoned the mine for economic reasons, the landowner

leased the land to a second mining operator. The arbitrator ruled
that the second lessee was not required to assume the wage agreement

of the prior lessee, even though the prior lessee had been a signatory
46
employer.
These decisions suggest that, where direct negotiations of any sort
occur between the prior and subsequent mine operators, sufficient

linkage will be found to make the subject transaction a "sale or
conveyance" under Article I.
2. Is a particularcoal-producingfacility an "'operation'"for
purposes of Article I?
Transfers of inactive coal mines have caused the most difficulty
with respect to interpreting the scope of the term "operations" as
used in prior wage agreements and in Article I of the 1988 Wage
Agreement. UMWA v. North Am. Coal Corp.47 apparently was the
first judicial interpretation of the term "operations" as used in Article I of the Wage Agreement, in the context of the sale of an
inactive facility. In North Am. Coal Corp., the union challenged the
sale of an inactive tipple as violative of Article I of the then existing
wage agreement. The defendant seller argued that its sale of the tipple

was not a sale of an "operation" covered by the NBCWA because
all activity at the facility had ceased approximately fourteen months

before the sale. 48 The court agreed with this contention and granted
summary judgment for the company. 49 The court was careful to con-

fine its decision to the facts presented, "particularly the announce46. Id. See also Past Coal Co., Arb. Dec. No. 84-30-84-23 (April 9, 1985) (Allen, Arb.). Past
Coal is typical of many of the arbitral awards on this issue, as the Union argued that the successorship
provisions of Article I required the employer (a new lessee) to follow the recall provisions of Article
XVII of the contract by honoring the panel of the former lessee. The arbitrator rejected this argument,
finding no linkage between the current lessee and its predecessor, which had simply abandoned operations.
47. UMWA v. North Am. Coal Corp., No. C-2-79-242 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 1980). The UMWA
has the right to bypass the contractual grievance-arbitration procedure in cases involving successorship
and bring such claims directly to federal court. See NBCWA of 1988, art. XXVII.
48. Id., at slip op. at 5.
49. Id.
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ment of the closing and the duration of the cessation of operations." 50
In addition, the court noted that at the time of its decision the buyer
of the tipple had not commenced operations at the mine or tipple.
Under those circumstances, the court concluded that the sale of the
tipple was the sale of a physical asset only, which did not constitute
the sale of operations as contemplated by Article 1.51
The North Am. Coal Corp. reasoning was adopted by the district
court in UMWA v. United States Steel Mining Co.,12 the only reported decision reaching this conclusion. There, the district court
stated:
Based on a careful reading of the 1984 NBCWA and the entire file, this court is

convinced that, as a matter of law, a mining 'operation,' for purposes of Article
I of the 1984 NBCWA, refers to a mine site or facility where active coal mining
operations are being conducted. That is, an 'operation' connotes a mine that is
actively producing coal and operating as a coal mine. Thus, a mine that has ceased

to function as an active coal mine is not an 'operation,' assuming the mine was
closed in good faith. The mine closure and subsequent sale must be carefully
scrutinized to determine whether the mine was closed and later sold in good faith

or as an attempt to circumvent or evade the collective bargaining agreement. This
utmost scrutiny is essential because a mine closure cannot be used by employers
as a subterfuge to escape their obligations under the collective bargaining agree-

ment. If there is even the slightest hint that a mine has been closed to circumvent
the collective bargaining agreement and undermine the successorship clause, a court
should not accord weight to the fact that the mine has been closed prior to the
sale. -"

Applying this standard, the court held that the sale of a mine that
had been closed for six months was not the sale of an "operation"
that required the seller to abide by the successorship provisions of
Article I, where the evidence showed that the mine had been closed
in good faith for legitimate economic reasons. 4
The district court's analysis in United States Steel Mining Co.
has been adopted by at least one arbitrator in a successorship dispute.
In Barbour Coal Co.," a signatory to the 1984 NBCWA sold a coal
50. Id. at 6.
51. Id.
52. UMWA v. United States Steel Mining Co., 636 F. Supp. 151 (D. Utah 1986), appealdocketed,
No. 86-1795 (10th Cir. May 29, 1986). This case has been scheduled for oral argument in May, 1988.
53. Id. at 153-54.
54. Id. at 154.
55. Barbour Coal Co., Arb. Dec. No. 84-31-86-180 (Aug. 14, 1986) (Kizer, Arb.).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/9
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tipple that had been closed for approximately two years to a nonsignatory of the 1984 Wage Agreement. Citing Unites States Steel
Mining Co., the arbitrator found that the sale of the tipple was not
the sale of an "operation" and that the successorship provisions of
the 1984 NBCWA contract therefore did not apply to the sale.5 6 The
arbitrator stated that "the primary reason Barbour is allowed to sell
the tipple here is that the tipple is an unnecessary and unused facility.
If the tipple was still being used, changing of the ownership would
not have removed the tipple from the Wage Agreement." 57 The arbitrator stressed that there was no evidence that the sale had been
58
undertaken in order to circumvent the provisions of the contract.
United States Steel Mining Co. and North Am. Coal Corp. thus
stand for the proposition that an inactive coal producing facility is
not an "operation" within the meaning of Article I, at least in situations where there is no evidence that the parties to the sale attempted to evade the requirements of Article I. The existence of such
evidence has caused other courts to reach the opposite conclusion.
In UMWA v. EastoverMining Co.,9 the Union asserted both breach
of contract and tortious interference with contractual relations in
bringing suit against both the selling and purchasing employers. The
purchaser in Eastoverrejected the seller's initial sales proposal, which
had contained language binding the purchaser to the labor contract.
The purchaser's counteroffer, which became the sales contract, deleted the obligatory language, reserved the purchaser's right to contest coverage under the labor contract, and expressly excepted the

56. Id., slip. op. at 4-6.
57. Id. at 6.
58. Id. Not all arbitrators have taken the position that the transfer of a shut-down coal-producing
facility is beyond the reach of the Wage Agreement. See, e.g., BethEnergy Corp., Arb. Dec. No. 8430-86-229 (Nov. 24, 1986) (Render, Arb.) (in a case involving a coal lease and an interpretation of
Article IA(f) of the 1984 NBCWA, the arbitrator concluded that the term "operations" in that provision
was broad enough to include coal lands on which no active mining had occurred, such that the successorship provisions of Article I were violated by the lease of surface mining rights). This decision
is discussed in more detail infra.
59. UMWA v. Eastover Mining Co., 603 F. Supp. 1038 (W.D. Va. 1985) (Eastover1) Subsequent
opinions in the case are reported at UMWA v. Eastover Mining Co., 623 F. Supp. 1141 (W.D. Va.
1985) (Eastover 11);
UMWVA v. Eastover Mining Co., (W.D. Va. Nov. 17, 1986) (memorandum order)
(Eastover III); UMWA v. Eastover Mining Co., (W.D. Va. Jan. 14, 1987) (memorandum order) (Eastover IV).
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labor contract from the seller's leases and contracts to be assumed
by the purchaser.
The district court's conclusion that the purchaser had tortiously
induced the seller's breach of Article I relied on the fact that the
purchaser first approached the seller with terms that fell short of the
seller's obligations under the successorship clause. 6 The court found
further evidence of the purchaser's tortious intent in that, prior to
the sale, the purchaser had conferred with a management consulting
firm about how to circumvent the successorship clause. 6' The consulting firm apparently recommended that the mine be idled for a
short time in order to facilitate a transfer without complying with
the provisions of Article I. Finally, the court rejected the purchaser's
contention that its insistence on these sales terms was justified. Balancing the interests of the plaintiff and the defendants, the court
concluded that "as a matter of policy, [the defendant's] interest ...
in negotiating freely as a prospective purchaser wanes when com'
pared to the interests represented by UMWA. "62
The court also found that the seller's failure to notify the Union
of the sale and to require the purchaser to assume the contract constituted a breach of its obligations under Article 1.63 The district court
was persuaded by the fact that the seller, in its first draft of the
purchase documents, had interpreted Article I as requiring it to obtain the purchaser's assumption of the NBCWA. As a result, the
court refused to accept as good faith arguments the seller's attempts
to argue otherwise, stating that, "[t]he intention was to evade, rather
than enter into a meaningful contract." 64
The district court's opinions in Eastover can be seen as a legitimate response to a seemingly transparent attempt to sell a coal mine
without complying with Article I of the Wage Agreement. What is
more significant about Eastover is that the court interpreted Article
I in an extremely broad manner, and concluded that, as applied to
60. Eastover I1, 623 F. Supp. at 1146-47.
61. Id. at 1147-48.
62. Id. at 1148.
63. Eastover I, 603 F. Supp. at 1045.
64. Id. at 1044.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/9
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a seller, it would apply to all sales of mines, whether the mine was
active or inactive, and even if the purchaser was not a Burns successor.

6

At least one other district court has suggested that a seller may
violate Article I of the Wage Agreement as a result of the sale of
an inactive mine. In UMWA v. Pickands-Mather& Co. ,66 the district
court refused to grant summary judgment to the selling employers
in a case arising out of a joint venture between Pickands-Mather
and Carolina Power, which resulted in two mining operations (Leslie
and McInnes) under the management of a Pickands-Mather subsidiary called Roberts. Carolina Power bought out Pickands-Mather's
interest following the cessation of mining operations in early 1983,
and decided to sell the assets. In the interim, Roberts had become
signatory to the 1981 Wage Agreement. Leslie and Mclnnes subsequently terminated their management contract with Roberts and sold
their assets to an affiliate of A.T. Massey by the name of Sidney.
Sidney did not assume the 1981 Wage Agreement, and the Union
filed suit under Section 301 of the Act, asserting a violation of Article
I by both the sellers and the purchasers.
The district court's opinion contains a lengthy discussion of successorship principles, which concludes by granting the motion to dismiss filed by A.T. Massey and its subsidiaries (the "Buyers'
Group").6 7 The court decided that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Section 301 over non-signatory parties, where the contract
did not set forth the "rights or duties" of the non-signatory.68 After
65. Id. at 1044-47. As discussed infra, the Eastover court's expansive reading of Article I must
be harmonized with the Supreme Court's development of labor law successorship in cases such as Burns
and Fall River.
66. UMWA v. Pickands-Mather & Co., No. 84-338 (E.D. Ky. May 15, 1987).
67. Id., slip op. at 18.
68. Id. at 13. This analysis is arguably inconsistent with the overriding objective of Article I of
the Wage Agreement that non-signatory coal operators do indeed have contractual "rights and duties,"
namely to assume the contract. The district court nonetheless concluded that, as a jurisdictional matter,

the Union could not bring an action against the non-signatory Buyers Group, relying on the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Service Hosp., Nursing Home & Public Employees Union v. Commercial Property
Serv., 755 F.2d 499 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985). In that case, the union attempted
to invoke Section 301 jurisdiction over a non-signatory employer based on a series of cases allowing

a third-party beneficiary to a collective bargaining agreement to bring an action under Section 301.
The Sixth Circuit rejected this theory, using the "rights or duties" analysis cited by the district court.
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dismissing the Section 301 claim, the court dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction the Union's pendant claim of tortious interference against the Buyer's Group.6 9 The court applied the suc-

cessorship principles of Burns and Howard Johnson in rejecting the
Union's claim that the labor agreement constituted an "equitable
servitude. "70
The district court reached a different result with respect to the
claims made against Pickands-Mather (and its subsidiaries) and Carolina Power. Concluding that further discovery was needed with re-

spect to the Union's alter ego and single employer arguments, the
court refused to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the PickandsMather companies. 71 The court similarly rejected Carolina Power's

motion to dismiss, concluding that the Union had stated a claim of
tortious interference against the utility. 72
The district court's opinion in Pickands-Matherthus suggests that
a prospective seller of an inactive coal-producing facility may well
face liability for failure to comply with the requirements of Article
I of the Wage Agreement, even in the absence of the sort of evidence
of intent that compelled the result in Eastover. Of course it can be
argued, as the Union did, that the parties to the Pickands-Mather
case were simply trying to be more clever than the parties in Eastover.
In any event, both cases suggest that the analysis of the district court
in United States Steel Mining Co. is far from settled authority. 73
Read in this light, the Pickands-Mather decision means that a non-signatory beneficiary may institute
suit under Section 301 if its rights and duties are stated in the contract, not that Section 301 jurisdiction
is available against a non-signatory. The district court's contrary conclusion in Eastover that it had
jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Act to hear a claim asserted against a non-signatory employer
reflects a division among the circuits as to the reach of Section 301. See Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc.,
824 F.2d 1477, 1480 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987) (Gilmore, J., dissenting). The new provisions of Article II of
the NBCWA of 1988 that extend contractual obligations to non-signatory operations suggests the district
court might reach a different result under the new Wage Agreement.
69. Id. at 14.
70. Id. at 14-17.
71. Id. at 19-20.
72. Id. at 21.
73. One of the principal arguments raised by the Union on appeal in United States Steel Mining
is that the district court's decision would, in effect, result in a forfeiture of the union members' panel
rights. Enforcement of panel rights in recall situations is a frequently litigated issue under the Wage
Agreement See, e.g., Local Union No. 2487 v. Blue Creek Mining Co., 806 F.2d 1552 (lth Cir.
1987) (employer ordered to arbitrate panel rights grievance filed against sister company; Art. XVII(k)
of the Wage Agreement treats affiliated companies "as one and the same Employer for panel rights
purposes").
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/9
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A finding that a transaction violates Article I of the 1988 Wage
Agreement can subject both buyer and seller to substantial liability.
Article I provides, by its terms, that the seller violates the contract
if it does not require the purchaser to assume the contract and notify
the Union of the transaction. Article I further provides that, in the
event the seller carries out these obligations, the seller is not a guarantor and cannot be held liable for the purchaser's subsequent breach
of the Wage Agreement. Article I thus suggests the allocation of
liability in situations in which a sales transaction did not comply
with the notice and assumption provisions of Article 1.74
The leading case outlining the nature of the seller's liability in
such circumstances is the Fourth Circuit's en banc decision in UMWA
v. Allied Corp.75 In Allied Corp., two mines were sold by Allied,
one to Armco and one to Shannon Pocahantas. Both companies
agreed to assume Allied's obligations under the NBCWA, with the
notable exception of Allied's obligations to provide health and other
non-pension benefits to its retired miners. 76 The district court issued
an injunction requiring Allied to continue these benefits unless and
until it could negotiate an agreement by which its successors undertook to make the payments. The Fourth Circuit upheld the district
court's injunction obligating Allied to continue meeting these NBCWA
obligations indefinitely for the duration of the Wage Agreement, or
until it convinced its successors to undertake those obligations. 77 The
Fourth Circuit's holding in Allied Corp. that the seller's liability
could be open-ended would seem equally applicable in an Article I
successorship case. The decision also suggests the measure of dam-

74. In addition to possible liability for damages, the Union may seek to enjoin a transaction if
the seller does not require the purchaser to assume the Wage Agreement. See, e.g., Local Lodge No.
1226 v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1981).
75. UMWA v. Allied Corp., 765 F.2d 412 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905 (1985).
76. Id. at 415. Article XX of the Wage Agreement establishes pension and benefit plans for the
benefit of UMWA members. The plans are funded by employer contributions based on tonnage of
coal produced. Under the 1974 Plan, employers are primarily responsible for providing pension and

benefit coverage via private insurers, with the 1974 Plan responsible only if the employer goes out of
business or otherwise is legally freed from its pension obligations. In Allied, the predecessor employer
remained in business and, since it had breached its Article I obligations, remained liable for pension
payments. Cf. Dist. 29, UMWA v. 1974 Benefit Plan and Tr., 826 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1987) (1974
Plan must provide benefits where employers remain in business but is not liable for payment of benefits).
77. Id. at 421.
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ages to be assessed against a buyer that refuses to assume the obligations of the Wage Agreement.
B.

The Coal Lands Provision

Article IA of the 1988 Wage Agreement contains several provisions that are relevant in any discussion of successorship and job
security. The first is Section 1A(f), which provides:
As part of the consideration for this Agreement, the Employers agree that this
Agreement covers the operation of all the coal lands, coal producing and coal
preparation facilities owned or held under lease by them, or any of them, or by
any subsidiary or affiliate at the date of this Agreement, or acquired during its

term which may hereafter (during the term of this Agreement) be put into production or use. This section will immediately apply to any new operations upon

the Union's recognition, certification, or otherwise properly obtaining bargaining
rights .78

Article 1A(f) has been broadly interpreted by some arbitrators to
mean that the contract extends to operations managed by affiliated
companies. In Nueast Mining Corp. 79 for example, the arbitrator
concluded that the employer was obligated to assume the Wage
Agreement by virtue of a "sister" company's execution of the contract, even though the mine in question had not been put into operation by the purchaser. The purchaser was required to give backpay
to UMWA members who had previously worked at the mine for
non-operational reclamation work that had been contracted out by
the purchaser.
The scope of the "affiliates" language in Article 1A(f) is, however, far from settled. In A. T. Massey Coal Co.,80 the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision requiring Massey and all of its
affiliated companies to submit to arbitration under the 1984 Wage
Agreement. According to the Fourth Circuit, the district court improperly ignored the rule that the existence of a contractual obligation to arbitrate is an issue for judicial rather than arbitrable

78. NBCWA of 1988, art. IA(f).
79. Nueast Mining Corp., Arb. Dec. No. 84-17-85-178 (Nov. 25, 1985) (Williams, Arb.).
80. A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. UMWA, 799 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1964 (1987).
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determination. 81 The union's claim rested on its interpretation of Article IA(f), which was rejected by a majority of the Fourth Circuit
panel. 82
The second issue raised by Article 1A(f) is the "after-acquired"
language in that provision, a matter that was interpreted in the Lone
Star Steel83 series of cases. Lone Star arose under the 1974 Wage
Agreement, and, among other issues, involved the employer's challenge to the provisions of Article 1A(f) in the Wage Agreement requiring that newly acquired operations would be subject to the Wage
Agreement. The Board concluded that this provision of Article 1A(f)
was not an unlawful "after acquired" clause in violation of Section
8(b)(3) and Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 84 The appellate court vacated
that part of the Board's decision, concluding that it was unlawful
for the union to bargain to impasse over a provision which effectively
expanded the scope of the bargaining unit, as such provisions are
85
non-mandatory subjects of bargaining.
Another unresolved issue under Article 1A(f) concerns the sorts
of transactions to which the provision applies. The Union, for example, has argued that Article 1A(f) of the Wage Agreement requires
the lessee of coal lands to assume the obligations of the NBCWA.
In BethEnergy Mines v. UMWA, 86 the employer sued to vacate an
arbitrator's award concluding that a lease of coal lands obligated the

81. Id. at 146-47.
82. See id. at 147 (Hall, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's ultimate conclusion that an
agreement to arbitrate has not been established). As of this writing, this case is still pending at the
district court level, following the Union's amendment of its complaint. The Fourth Circuit correctly
decided that the issue of arbitrability is properly one for the courts, thus making arbitration decisions
like the one in Nueast Mining of questionable value.
83. Lone Star Steel Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 573 (1977), rev'd in part sub nom. Lone Star Steel Co.
v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981); on remand Lone Star
Steel Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 368 (1982) appeal after remand, Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 766 F.2d 1459
(1985).
84. Lone Star Steel Co., 231 N.L.R.B. at 576. Section 8(b)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice
for a union to refuse to bargain in good faith. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1982).
85. Lone Star Steel Co., 639 F.2d at 558-59. The court found objectionable the language in
Article 1(f) automatically applying the entire contract, including its noneconomic provisions, to other
appropriate units at other locations, as not vitally affecting employees in the existing unit. Id. at 557.
86. BethEnergy Mines v. UMWA, No. 87-38 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 1, 1988) (Magistrate's Report and
Recommendation).
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lessor to insure the lessee's assumption of the Wage AgreementY
Relying on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Clinchfield Coal Co. v.
District 28, UMWA,88 the magistrate recommended that the arbitrator's award should be vacated, because the arbitrator failed to apprehend the distinction between "coal operations" and "coal lands." 8 9
C.

The Leasing and Licensing Provision

Section 1A(h) of the 1988 Wage Agreement contains the "leasing
and licensing" provision, which states:
The Employers agree that they will not lease, sublease or license out any coal
lands, coal producing or coal preparation facilities where the purpose therof is to
avoid the application of this Agreement or any section, paragraph or clause thereof.
Licensing out of coal mining operations on coal lands owned or held under lease
or sublease by any signatory operator hereto shall not be permitted unless the
licensing out does not cause or result in the layoff of Employees of the Employer. 9'

This Article was interpreted in the Clinchfield Coal Co.91 cases. The
courts have enforced arbitrators' decisions holding that the licensing
of an operation covered by the Wage Agreement violates Article
1A(h) if it results in the layoff of employees covered by the Wage
Agreement, even if the employees work at a separate location.Y
IV.

NEw JOB SECURITY PRovisIoNs IN TnE
AGREEMENT

1988 WAGE

The recently ratified 1988 Wage Agreement 93 contains new job
security language that may affect business decisions to dispose of or
87. See BethEnergy Corp., and discussion supra note 58.
88. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. UMWA, 556 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Va.), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1365 (4th
Cir. 1983); 567 F. Supp. 1431 (W.D. Va. 1983), aff'd, 736 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1984).
89. BethEnergy Mines, slip op. at 6-7.
90. Article IA(h) of the 1984 Wage Agreement contained a detailed procedure requiring lessees
and licensees to make offers of employment to laid-off employees of signatory employers. This procedure has been revised and included in the new Article II(B) of the 1988 Wage Agreement.
91. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. UMWA, 556 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Va.), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1365 (4th
Cir. 1983); 567 F. Supp. 1431 (W.D. Va. 1983), aff'd, 736 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1984).
92. Big Bear Mining Co. v. UMWA, 579 F. Supp. 1072 (S.D. W. Va. 1983). In Big Bear,
UMWA members were laid off at the Big Bear Mine #4, while the employer simultaneously licensed
out operation of Eagle Mine #5. Big Bear then purchased the coal mined at Eagle Mine #5,Though
none of the laid off miners had worked at Eagle Mine #5, the arbitrator held that their layoff was
caused by the licensing out of Eagle Mine #5, and ordered that Big Bear offer reinstatement to the
laid off miners.
93. The NBCWA of 1988 was ratified on February 11, 1988. By its terms, it applies retroactively
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/9
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acquire mine properties. While the successorship language of Article
I was left unchanged, an entirely new Article II, entitled Job Opportunity and Benefit Security ("JOBS"), was added to the contract.
Nominally, JOBS is completely distinct from the successorship provision of Article I: it contains language that, "[n]othing in the JOBS
program shall be construed to diminish any rights ... established
in ... the successorship clause

. . ."94

However, its new provisions,

which affect both job security at non-signatory operations and leasing
and licensing activities at signatory operations, create significant new
obligations for industry employers.
A.

Obligations at Non-Signatory Operations.

The JOBS provisions create significant new obligations with respect to an employer's non-signatory operations. The obligations under this article attach to "any existing, new or newly acquired nonsignatory operations"; in other words, a signatory to the 1988 Wage
Agreement now has contractual obligations related to all of its mining
operations, both signatory and non-signatory.
The essential aspect of the obligations required by JOBS is that,
for operations falling within its scope, an employer must fill the first
three of every five new jobs from the employer's panels of laid-off
miners from its signatory operations. 95
The JOBS provisions represent an attempt to extend job security
protection to UMWA miners by extending panel rights to coal properties that may be acquired by a signatory employer whether or not
the acquisition is found to be subject to Article I of the Wage Agreement. As a result, the JOBS provisions could well have the effect
of extending panel rights to inactive properties acquired by a signatory employer. To that extent, the JOBS provisions represent an
attempt by the Union to bypass the limitation to the scope of Article
I recognized in cases such as United States Steel Mining Co.
One of the most important questions left unanswered by this part
of Article II concerns the scope of the signatory employer's obli-

94. NBCWA of 1988, art. II.
95. Id.
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gations to hire three of five employees at non-signatory operations
in those situations in which the non-signatory mines are operated by
a separate division or subsidiary of the signatory employer. The use
of separate corporate subsidiaries at different mining operations is
very common in the coal industry. Under the Board's single employer
doctrine, the labor relations obligations of an employer do not extend
to an affiliated business entity, absent evidence of common ownership, common management, common control of labor relations,
and integration of operations. 96 The single employer determination,
much like the successorship issue discussed above, is a very factintensive matter in which the Board considers the totality of the
circumstances .97
Article II refers to non-signatory operations of the "Employer",
with no mention of other operations that may be managed by some
other business entity with a financial relationship with the employer.
Employers organized to do business in this fashion can be expected
to rely on the single employer doctrine and assert that Article II does
not extend beyond the non-signatory operations of the signatory employer. 9 The Union is just as likely to assert that the obligations of
the JOBS provisions extend to all operations that are related by common ownership to the signatory employer, and/or its corporate parent. In addition to urging a broader reading of the JOBS provisions,99
the Union can be expected to rely on other provisions in the Wage
Agreement that purport to extend contractual coverage to affiliates
of the signatory employer. 100 It obviously remains to be seen which
'interpretation of Article II will prevail in the inevitable litigation over
this issue.
The JOBS provisions represent substantial job security gains for
the union. The "three out of five" requirement will virtually guar96. See Los Angeles Newsp. Guild, 185 N.L.R.B. 303 (1970), enforced, Los Angeles Newsp.
Guild v. NLRB, 443 F.2d I173 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972); American Fed'n
of Television & Radio Artists, 185 N.L.R.B. 593 (1970), enforced 462 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
97. See, e.g., Soule Glass & Glazing Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 792 (1972).
98. See, e.g., American Bell, Inc. v. Federation of Telephone Workers of Pa., 736 F.2d 879
(3d Cir. 1984).
99. The bargaining history of the 1988 Wage Agreement reflects the Union's unsuccessful attempt
to get management to agree to a broader definition of the term "employer," virtually guaranteeing
that the Union's attempt to expand the scope of the JOBS commitment will be resisted by coal operators.
100. E.g., NBCWA of 1988, art. IA(h).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/9

24

Geis and Smith: Labor Law Successorship under the National Bituminous Coal Wage A
1988]

LABOR LAW SUCCESSORSHIP

antee that a majority of employees hired at a covered non-signatory
operation will have UMWA loyalties. As a result, the Union will
promptly demand recognition at such locations and seek to extend
the Wage Agreement to such operations. 0 1

The JOBS provisions also may affect the willingness of a nonsignatory employer to consider the purchase of mine property, albeit
for different reasons. Under the 1984 Wage Agreement, a non-sig-

natory purchaser merely needed to evaluate the likelihood that the
purchase would be deemed an Article I transfer and that the pur-

chaser would be obligated to assume the obligations of the Wage
Agreement at that operation. In the worst case, where the non-signatory purchaser eventually would be required to assume the Wage

Agreement; only the purchased operation would be affected. The
situation may be different under the 1988 Wage Agreement. A pro-

spective purchaser now must be aware that, if it is forced to assume
the Wage Agreement at a single operation, it will in effect have given
the UMWA a toehold at the remainder of its operations. 0 2 This

possibility dramatically increases the risk to a potential non-signatory
purchaser that wishes to maintain non-union operations. Under the
1988 Wage Agreement, a single transaction that is held to require

compliance with Article I could enmesh that operator's entire set of
1
operations in the provisions of the Wage Agreement. 03
Article II represents the Union's latest attempt to bring about

contractually-mandated extensions of the 1988 Wage Agreement to
new operations developed by signatory employers. The requirement

101. This obligation is not as extensive as the obligation created under the so-called "Island Creek
Contract," the 1987 EESP. The EESP was an interim agreement entered into by the UMWA and
several coal companies in which the Union granted certain reductions in pension payment obligations
in return for job security provisions. Signatories of the EESP agreed to staff new and non-signatory
operations wholly with UMWA members, including, if necessary, miners with no previous employment
relationship with the signatory. For each operation, signatories also agreed either to assume the obligations of the EESP or to voluntarily recognize the union subsequent to a check of union authorization
cards. 1987 Employment and Economic Security Pact between Island Creek Corp. and the UMWA,
Memorandum on Employment Opportunity and Job Security § I(C). By its terms, the EESP expired
when the 1988 NBCWA was ratified by the union. Id., Memorandum on the term of the 1987 EESP
and Committment to the Successor National Agreement.
102. NBCWA of 1988, art. I.
103. Article II purportedly applies regardless of whether the purchaser is found to be a successor
to the previous operator. This is true both for Burns successorship and contractual successorship.
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that three of each five openings at a non-signatory operation must
be filled by employees on the signatory employer's panels virtually
guarantees that the Union will seek to extend the NBCWA to all
such operations. Despite the disclaimer language in Article II in which
the parties disavow-any intent to extend the bargaining union," 4 the
staffing requirements of Article II raise unanswered questions under
Section 8(a) of the Act. 10 5 In practical effect, Article II of the 1988
Wage Agreement will work very much like a so-called "after acquired" clause.
The conditions by which parties can agree to such provisions in
collective bargaining were established by the Board's decision in
Houston Div. of Kroger Stores.10 6 In that case, the Retail Clerks
Local 455 and the Meat Cutters Local 408 sought to represent employees in a grocery store that had been transferred into a division
of Kroger covered by such a clause. The Board first held that the
"after acquired" provisions meant than an employer may recognize
the union after it shows majority support, but that the employer
could refuse to recognize the union voluntarily and, instead, require
an election.107 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia reversed, reasoning that the Board's initial
interpretation would reduce the contractual provision to a nullity. 08
The court remanded the case to the Board to determine whether the
contractual provision was permissible under Section 7 of the Act as
a waiver of the employer's right to demand an election when faced
with a union's showing of majority support.? 9 On remand, the Board
concluded that such clauses are valid if they "require recognition

104. Article II(A)(7) provides that "[niothing in this section shall operate to extend the bargaining

unit as of the date of this Agreement nor expand the rights of the Union with regard to the nonsignatory operations, except for the job opportunities made available under this section."

105. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1S8(a)(2) & (b)(3) (1982). Section 8(a) lists specific restrictions on employer
activity that, if undertaken, constitute unfair labor practices. When an employer recognizes and bargains
with a union prior to proof of majority status, it has interfered with the employees' right to choose
their own collective bargaining representative in violation of the Act.
106. Houston Div. of Kroger Stores, 219 N.L.R.B. 388 (1975), modifying 208 N.L.R.B. 928
(1974), on remandfrom Retail Clerks Local 455 v. NLRB, 510 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
107. Kroger Stores, 208 N.L.R.B. at 931.
108. Kroger Stores, 510 F.2d at 805-06.
109. Id. at 806-07.
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upon proof of majority status by a union."

10

Because the union had

presented proof of its majority status, the Board concluded that Kro-

ger committed an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(5)
in refusing to bargain with the unions with respect to employees at
the new locations. 1 '
Kroger and its progeny make it clear that, in the absence of evidence of majority support, an employer is under no obligation to

extend a labor contract to a new location. Indeed, under such circumstances, recognition of the union would be an unfair labor practice in violation of sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(2) and 8(a)(3) of the Act.112
The policy underlying these decisions is the Board's recognition that

an automatic extension of a collective bargaining agreement to a new
facility may violate the Section 7 rights of that facility's employees
to determine for themselves, generally by secret ballot election, if
3
they wish to be represented by the union."
Article II's staffing requirements represent a novel attempt to

4
obtain automatic extension of a collective bargaining agreement."
Article II is, in effect, a type of "two-step" after-acquired clause.

It requires, first, that the employer offer preferential hiring rights at

its non-signatory locations to laid-off Union members. These preferential hiring rights will often result in the Union asserting that a

majority of the workforce desires UMWA representation. The majority showing will, presumably, lead the Union in many cases to
demand that the Wage Agreement be automatically extended to the

new location.
110. Kroger Stores 219 N.L.R.B. at 389.
111. Id. The rationale of Kroger has been endorsed in numerous subsequent Board decisions.
E.g., UFCW Local 576, 267 N.L.R.B. 891 (1983); Joseph Magnin Co., 257 N.L.R.B. 656 (1981), aff'd,
704 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984); W.C. DuComb West, 239 N.L.R.B.
964 (1978); S.B. Rest of Framingham, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 506 (1975).
112. See Bristol Consolidators, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 602, 604-05 (1978) (a contract provision providing that any newly opened warehouse would be represented by the union "provides no defense to
Respondent Company's recognition of Local 564 without giving the employees a say in the selection
of the bargaining representation"). Accord Dura Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 592 (1965) (violation to extend
contract to new plant).
113. See, e.g., UFCW Local 576, 267 N.L.R.B. 891 (1983).
114. Article II is, in this regard, a response to the Board's decision in Lone Star Steel Co. in
which the Board found the "after acquired" language of Article IA(h) to be violative of Sections 8(a)(3)
and (b)(3) of the Act. The language of the current Article IA(h) has been modified to make it clear
that it does not become effective absent a showing of union majority status.
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Despite the disclaimer language in Article II(A)(7), it remains to
be seen if this provision will survive legal challenge. Depending on
the facts of a particular situation, the Union's efforts to enforce this
provision in Article II might constitute an unfair labor practice.'
Likewise, quite apart from the nature of the Union's enforcement
action, a preferential hiring scheme such as that set forth in Article
II may be challenged as analogous to a more sophisticated form of
illegal hiring hall." 6 Enforcement of this provision would seem particularly unfair in the case of non-signatory operations managed by
affiliates of the signatory employer, in the absence of evidence of
an intent to avoid the Wage Agreement." 7 Even if the affiliate and
the signatory employer are not found to be single employers,"" the
Union's attempt to enforce Article II could be found to violate both
20
Section 8(b)(3)" 9 and Section 8(b)(4) of the Act.
B.

New Leasing and Licensing Provisions.

Major changes also were made in the leasing and licensing provisions of the NBCWA. Although the Article I(A)(h) distinction between "coal lands" and "coal operations" was left unchanged, the

115. See TCH Coal Co., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (Jan. 31, 1986). In TCH Coal, the ALJ evaluated
the legality of a UMWA strike designed to force a lessee to assume the NBCWA. After holding that
the lessee was not a Burns successor to a previous lessee, the ALJ ruled that the Union's strike violated
Sections 8(b)(1)(A), 8(b)(2), and 8(b)(4) of the Act.
116. Section 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act have been interpreted to make unlawful
a hiring hall which operates to give union members preference in referrals for employment. See United
Bhd. of Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961); Wolf Trap Found., 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1129 (1988). The Board's rules restricting the extent to which union officers may be given superseniority
may, by similar analogy, be relied upon in developing an argument that Article II unlawfully extends
union influence to non-signatory operations. See, e.g., NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local
338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976); IUE Local 663, 276 N.L.R.B. 109 (Sept. 30, 1985), enforced sub
nom. IUE Local 900 v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
117. Compare Eastover Mining Co., 603 F. Supp. 1038.
118. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
119. Section 8(b)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to refuse to bargain in good
faith. This provision has been interpreted to include certain union conduct seeking expansion of the
bargaining unit, as this topic is considered by the Board to be a permissive, but not mandatory, subject
of bargaining. See Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 602 F.2d 73 (4th Cir.
1979).
120. Section 8(b)(4) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in certain types of
"secondary activity." See, e.g., TCH Coal Co., 278 N.L.R.B. 45 (Jan. 31, 1986); Operating Engineers
Local 542, 216 N.L.R.B. 408 (1975), enforced, 532 F.2d 902 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1072 (1977) (York County Bridge, Inc.).
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remainder of the leasing and licensing provisions were amended, reshaped, and added to Article 11.121 The substance of the leasing and
licensing provisions is very similar to the requirements of JOBS. According to the new language of Article II(B), a signatory employer
must, as a predicate to leasing or licensing any of its coal lands or
operations, require the lessee or licensee to agree initially to offer
all job positions to members of the signatory employer's panels. Article IIB also contains provisions that describe the signatory's obligations when the lessee or licensee is itself organized by the UMWA
or any other union. These provisions allow the lessee or licensee, in
some situations, to continue using its current employees. This "escape" provision, however, does not apply when the operation in
question was at any time a signatory operation; at such operations,
all jobs must be offered to the signatory's employees.
As with Article II(A), the preferential hiring provisions of Article
122
II(B) may be subject to legal attack.

V. TowARD A MoRE LOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE I OF
THE WAGE AGREEMENT

The foregoing discussing suggests serious disagreement among arbitrators and the courts over the proper interpretation of Article I
of prior Wage Agreements. Similar battles over the meaning of Article II of the NBCWA of 1988 are inevitable. This uncertainty makes
it very difficult for coal industry operators to be able to anticipate
with any degree of predictability whether or not a particular transaction will be found to have violated Article I of the Wage Agreement. Similarly, the new job security provisions added to the 1988
Wage Agreement makes it possible for the Union to extend the contract to coal properties that otherwise would not be subject to Article

121. NBCWA of 1988, art. II(B).
122. Article II(B)(2) commands that "all offers of employment ... shall first be made to the
Employer's classified laid-off Employees." When the operation in question had previously been a
signatory operation of the signatory employer, the Wage Agreement specifically states that the employer's laid-off employees must be given first chance at the job opportunities, notwithstanding any
collective bargaining obligations of the lessee/licensee. This provision may well be an illegal extension
of union jurisdiction into an area where it has not been certified as the collective bargaining representative.
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I, as well as exacerbate an employer's concerns in the event it miscalculates. This lack of predictability is contributing to the continued
distressed state of the industry, because operators that might otherwise purchase coal assets and reopen abandoned properties are often reluctant to do so because of the 1988 Wage Agreement's
successorship provisions.
The Union clearly has legitimate interests in insuring that unscrupulous operators do not evade their contractual responsibilities.
Decisions such as Eastover and Pickands-Matherare not an appropriate response to attempts at evading the Wage Agreement. Notwithstanding this interest, it is not sensible to accept the Union's
ultimate argument that every transaction involving any coal property
that was ever owned by any employer that was signatory to the Wage
Agreement is subject to Article I of the Wage Agreement. Such an
argument is at odds with the statutory policy objectives articulated
by the Supreme Court in Burns and Fall River to protect an employer's interest in being able to transfer capital, and the Section 7
rights of the employees to choose or reject unionization.'2 3 Overlyexpansive interpretations of the NBCWA ultimately are inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's admonishment in Burns that "serious inequities" would result if a new employer is burdened by the inefficient terms and conditions of employment that helped to insure the
demise of its predecessor. The Union's position, carried to its logical
conclusion, is that the labor contract constitutes an equitable servitude equivalent to a covenant running with the land. 2 4 Indeed, the
Union's overzealous attempt to apply Article I of the Wage Agreement is ultimately self-defeating, because it inevitably draws the industry further towards development of coal reserves in non-union
areas and to the utilization of international sources of coal.
Given this situation, the proper scope of the Wage Agreement
should reflect the legitimate interests of both labor and management.

123. Burns, 406 U.S. at 287-89. The Court in Burns stressed that an employer may not be interested in acquiring a moribund business if he is to be saddled with the terms and conditions of
employment contained in the old labor contract. See also FallRiver, 107 S. Ct. at 2234 ("to a substantial
extent the applicability of Burns rests in the hands of the successor").
124. Cf. Pickands-Mather, No. 84-338, slip op. at 15.
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In transactions involving abandoned coal properties, the analysis of
the district court in United States Steel Mining Co. strikes a fair
balance between the interests of the Union in enforcing its contractual
entitlements and protecting the job security rights of its members,
and the industry's legitimate interest in attempting to operate at a
reasonable profit. Arbitration and judicial decisions that attempt to
apply the successorship provisions of Article I to cases involving an
economically motivated cessation of business are unwise, to the extent that they fail to accommodate the principles articulated in Burns.
Said differently, a purchaser should not be obligated to assume the
Wage Agreement unless it is first established that it is a Burns successor. Similar common-sensical interpretations should be given to
the other unresolved issues posed by the NBCWA of 1988. The district court's decision in Pickands-Matherto reject the Union's equitable servitude argument, for example, illustrates the proper
accommodation of the competing interests. Contractual restrictions
on the transfer of capital should not be interpreted in a manner that
is inconsistent with important policy considerations under the Act.
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